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The First Amendment was once thought of as the law of the political underdog. Its
archetypal bene ciary was the humble pamphleteer whose unpopular ideas eventually gain
majority support.  From this narrative arose the original and still most powerful justi cation
for First Amendment review: the protection of political debate and the democratic process,
which powered Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States as well as
New York Times v. Sullivan’s assertion that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.”  And today, in tough cases, the Court continues to rely on
democratic process as a justi cation for striking down enacted laws.”
Today, however, the First Amendment’s role in the American political process has changed
decisively. It can longer be described as a law that protects unpopular speakers or other
politically weak actors in the Carolene Products sense.  If the First Amendment could once
be described as a remedy for defects in the political process, it has now as o en become the
cause of such defects. For today’s First Amendment is regularly deployed not to promote or
facilitate political debate but to end it.  Across broad areas of public regulation, the
judiciary has intervened to shut down active political debate in the  elds of privacy,
telecommunication, securities, false advertising, and health and safety regulation, among
others.
In such cases, in process terms, the First Amendment is playing a very di erent role than
envisioned in cases like Sullivan. It cannot be described with a straight face as enabling
political debate. It is, instead, a tool of regulatory leverage used by politically powerful
groups. And, at the risk of stating the obvious, this newer role played by the law is in tension
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with its goal of promoting democracy; yet there is no doctrinal tool speci cally designed to
prevent the First Amendment from biting its own tail.
As a means of addressing the gap, this paper suggests an “anti-circumvention” principle that
may be usefully invoked in certain First Amendment cases. The principle would be used by
the judiciary, in its discretion, to limit the use of the First Amendment to circumvent an
ongoing and functioning political debate. More precisely: In cases where the underlying law
does not censor political speech, nor arise from majoritarian prejudice against a despised or
unpopular speaker, and particularly where the political debate is in progress, the judiciary
should avoid using the First Amendment to give one side of the debate a judicially granted
circumvention of democratic politics.
“First Amendment opportunism,” Fred Schauer’s phrase, well describes the cases that call
for application of the anti-circumvention principle.  Practically speaking, this doctrine
would call for a di erent outcome in close cases like Sorrell v. IMS Health or United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., where the defendants sought to overcome their defeats in
highly contested political processes at the state and federal levels, respectively.  Far from the
classic model of a politically disenfranchised speaker with an unpopular message, these are
cases where politically well-represented subjects lost legislative battles, and turned to the
First Amendment as an alternative.
Some of the cases I’ve mentioned might also be criticized as “First Amendment Lochnerism,”
so it might be useful to clarify what a process-based approach adds. I am sympathetic to
both the label and the critique but believe that a process approach o ers di erent insights.
The Lochnerist critique rightly points out that using the First Amendment to protect
economic liberties parallels the judicial abuses of power practiced by the Supreme Court in
the early 20th century.  But the process approach o ers a broader assessment of when First
Amendment review is justi ed or not, and is less tethered to the commercial-speech
doctrine. It asks courts to broadly consider if their own judicial intervention threatens the
democracy-promoting values of the First Amendment itself. And while this short essay
cannot hope to fully describe the interactions of democratic process and the First
Amendment, I hope it may make a start.
I want to stress that what I am suggesting here is not a rejection of constitutional review but
a discretionary limitation based on an overriding interest in democratic process.  In New
York Times v. Sullivan, the Court asserted that the First Amendment should be enforced to
promote “free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people.”  This paper asks reviewing courts to examine carefully whether a litigant’s
claim would actually facilitate “free political discussion” or do the opposite. Reduced to a
sentence, what this paper asks a reviewing court to do is something familiar: examine the
political context in which the case arises and then ask whether it stands on stronger or
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Should this seem too vague, consider the following three situations in which a court might
be asked to strike down legislation or a regulation under the First Amendment. In the  rst,
the judge is asked to enforce the Amendment to protect a litigant’s expression of political
ideas or views. In such a case, the judiciary is at the zenith of its legitimacy, engaged in an
Abrams- or Sullivan-based defense of democratic process by protecting the expression of
ideas and opinions that might not otherwise be heard. Such heightened review may also be
justi ed if the judge is being asked to protect the speech of a widely despised or poorly
represented group expressing unpopular ideas (in shorthand, a Carolene Products context
). Overbreadth claims can fall into this category, especially if they a ect bystanders to the
political process.
A second category includes judicial intervention that is not directly related to the
enhancement or abrogation of the political process. Here the judiciary is typically protecting
social, aesthetic, moral, commercial, or other ideas and experiences. Judges may rely on
justi cations that are unrelated to protecting the democratic process but are instead related
to the speakers’ liberty interests or the listeners’ interest in receiving information.
The third category — the focus of this paper — comprises cases that are an evident e ort to
use the First Amendment either to abrogate an ongoing political debate or to circumvent a
political defeat. A prerequisite is the presence of a fully and fairly contested policy debate by
well-represented parties, possibly on a state-by-state basis, where the judiciary is asked to
intervene and put an end to the political process. Here the judge should understand that he
or she is at a nadir of legitimate reviewing power, given that his or her own action will
terminate the kind of political debate the First Amendment was designed to promote.
Such considerations are not always easy: far simpler for a court just to pretend that cases
arrive without a political history or that every party before the court is in the position of the
oppressed pamphleteer humbly seeking justice and vindication in the courts. But that is to
ignore political reality. In most First Amendment cases, the courts now face plainti s whose
legislative losses are not silencing but are part of a larger, ongoing political process where
the judicial intervention simply creates new winners and losers. Given that reality, it is
willful blindness to pretend that enforcement of the First Amendment is always an aid to
democracy.
The Majoritarian Justi ication for an Anti-
Majoritarian First Amendment
A major premise of this paper is so obvious as to be hiding in plain sight: that enforcement
of the First Amendment has long been justi ed as a remedy for failings in the American
political process. I don’t want to suggest that this is the only reason courts enforce the First
Amendment, but it has historically been the most important reason and one that retains a
commanding currency in our time.
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The link between the First Amendment and political process originates with the well-known
judges who invigorated the First Amendment in the  rst half of the twentieth century. These
judges — Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Hand — viewed it as a way to protect the democratic
political process from becoming warped by government censorship or punishment of
disfavored speakers.  That is what made it possible for strong believers in majoritarian
democracy like Holmes and Hand to author the founding opinions in the First Amendment
tradition. “It is noteworthy,” writes Vince Blasi, that these judges “went out of their way to
avoid recognizing a free-standing individual right of expressive liberty that exists apart from
and thereby limits the principle of majority rule.”
The majoritarian defense of First Amendment review is best captured in Holmes’ famous
dissent in Abrams, a case where anti-war lea ets were distributed by being thrown out of a
window.  Holmes’ dissent sought to justify judicial review on strong grounds: as the
protection of the democratic process itself. Holmes believed that political truth is both
unknowable and changing; that majority opinion is essentially dynamic in nature, for “time
has upset many  ghting faiths.”  The best approximation of truth, he believed, came out of
a marketplace of ideas; hence the First Amendment should protect an open competition of
ideas that might help a nation  nd the answers to its most pressing problems.
These ideas remain a mainstay of First Amendment doctrine. They were strongly a rmed in
New York Times v. Sullivan, where the court protected a strident and accusatory political
advertisement from a libel suit so as to enable “free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people.”  And decades later, the country
remains on an ongoing search for political answers to its hardest questions, and the
Supreme Court continues to rely upon a process justi cation in many of its hardest cases.
Take, for example, the Citizens United decision, which struck down a restriction on political
speech by corporations. Facing a strong dissent, the majority insisted that the decision was
justi ed to a ord the strongest possible protection for the democratic process, given that
“speech . . . is an essential mechanism of democracy.” Moreover, “the right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government.”
To be sure, Abrams/Sullivan–stylefacilitation of the democratic process does not exhaust the
reasons the judiciary has used to justify its interventions. Even among the early cases, the
famous Whitney concurrence presented a broader assessment of how freedom of thought and
speech serves democratic values.  And over the years, the court has found reason to give
protection to speech having nothing to do with political debate but instead touching on
artistic, commercial, or cultural expression. There is no use or reason here to dismiss the
many other reasons, highlighted by scholars like Robert Post and Jack Balkin, that freedom
of speech might be a valuable part of a democracy broadly considered.  But in this paper I
want to focus not on the periphery of the First Amendment but its core and point out that the
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The point can be put this way. The broadening of First Amendment protection to matters
such as artistic or commercial speech certainly has its own set of justi cations, best
described as rooted in concerns for liberty.  But the under-recognized danger is that such
broader protections can set the liberty- and democracy-promoting justi cations of the First
Amendment against each other, as judicial intervention comes to undermine the larger goal
of promoting democracy and political debate. I’m not saying that the First Amendment’s
goal of promoting democratic debate should automatically trump the protection of liberty,
but it cannot be that it counts for nothing. This is what I mean when I say that the First
Amendment needs to be prevented from biting its own tail.
There is no better way to demonstrate that danger than looking more carefully at a few cases.
As we shall see, there is a striking dissonance in a Court’s willingness to glorify open
political debate as it intervenes to stop such debates in their tracks.
From Enabling Debate to Ending It
Privacy Regulation
In the early 2000s it was  rst widely reported that commercial chain pharmacies — Rite-Aid,
CVS, and so on — were selling private prescription records without the consent of doctors or
patients.  Pharmacies are generally required by law to store an enormous amount of private
prescription data.  The laws banned the sale of patient data but not the prescribing
information of doctors. Sensing an opportunity, the pharmacies began selling their records
to marketing  rms, who in turn created marketing pro les to help drug companies sell to
doctors.
Doctors were generally unaware that they were being pro led, but when knowledge of the
practice became public, a number of state and national doctors’ associations (but not the
American Medical Association) condemned the practice as both unethical and a violation of
privacy.  The states would later claim that the practices raised their public insurance costs
by encouraging doctors to prescribe more expensive drugs.  New laws seeking to ban the
resale of prescribing data were introduced in 29 states around the country.  Publicity
campaigns and outreach surrounding the practices generated phone-in and email
campaigns.
Facing the prospect of new regulation, the pharmacies, the pharmaceutical industry, and
data-mining  rms fought back. They portrayed the privacy concerns as overblown and
instead stressed the bene ts of data mining. The in uential American Medical Association
intervened on the side of the drug companies arguing that “restrictions on the use of
prescription information could disrupt health care research and its corresponding bene ts
for patients, government agencies, health planners, academicians, businesses and others.”
Across the country, lobbyists for industry actively discouraged passage of the laws as a
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There was, in short, a robust political debate, one that could be used to illustrate how the
American democratic and federal processes are supposed to work. The press discovered and
publicized the practice. Agitated citizens and a ected groups turned to their local
representatives, who proposed legislative action. The industry and other parts of civil
society, like the AMA, fought the laws with strong arguments stressing the bene ts of
practices that looked unattractive on their face. The debate, moreover, proceeded on a state-
by-state basis, following Brandeis’ dictum that “a state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”  States that enacted new privacy laws were engaged in an experiment that might
inspire others to follow — or, in time, prove a costly folly that others could learn from.
A few other matters are relevant to the analysis. No one could claim that the new laws were
designed to silence political debate. Nor can it plausibly be argued that the pharmacies or
data miners were a group unable to use the political process to defend themselves; there was
nothing that might “curtail the operation of those political processes” meant to protect
them, in the words of Carolene Products.  In fact, with their large lobbying budgets, the
opponents were arguably overrepresented, even if they faced worthy opponents in the New
England medical societies.
So what happened? On a state-by-state count, the pharmacies won the political battle in
more states than they lost, managing to stop or at least delay passage of a new privacy law in
most of the states. But such laws did successfully pass in New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Maine, thanks mainly to the e orts of local medical societies. The Vermont society would
later write that it “spent much of the 2007 Vermont legislative session championing the law.”
However, something of real importance did happen during the legislative process. Vermont
and New Hampshire each decided to include exceptions to the ban on the sale of private
prescribing data, as a response to some of the bene ts stressed by the AMA, industry groups,
and universities, among others. Most importantly, the Vermont legislature put in exceptions
for “health care research,” for “educational purposes,” and as made necessary for law
enforcement or other laws. Introducing such exceptions is, of course, commonplace in
legislative process and might be considered good practice; yet, as we shall see, the
exceptions ended up being a poison pill for First Amendment purposes.
Medical privacy is obviously a matter of great and ongoing public concern, but this
particular political debate was interrupted by the courts. For a er losing in the New England
legislatures, the opponents of the laws, with the help of counsel, reimagined themselves as
politically disadvantaged speakers and, in their federal complaint, argued that their speech
was burdened by the new laws.  They made two arguments:  rst, that the sale of
prescription data was a form of speech, unfairly burdened by the new law, and second, that
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The First Circuit threw out the New Hampshire case, with Judge Seyla, for the court,
asserting that the pharmacies were really in no di erent a position than the sellers of any
other commodity.  “The plainti s, who are in the business of harvesting, re ning, and
selling this commodity, ask us in essence to rule that because their product is information
instead of, say, beef jerky, any regulation constitutes a restriction of speech. We think that
such an interpretation stretches the fabric of the First Amendment beyond any rational
measure.”  A second panel of the First Circuit agreed.  But the Second Circuit accepted the
simple formula described above: that the sale of private data by pharmacies was “speech”
that was burdened by the new law.  The state’s interests, the court decided, were
insu ciently “advanced” to justify the laws  ; hence, the law was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court took the Vermont case and struck down the state’s law based on a
di erent legal theory: discriminatory censorship.  The Court seized on the exceptions put
into the law for “research,” “education,” and “law enforcement” to claim that the data
miners were being selectively punished based on the type of speech they were engaged in
(i.e., marketing to doctors, as opposed to research).  More precisely, the Court declared the
law a “content- and speaker-based” burden that was “aimed” at pharmacies, pharmaceutical
companies, and data miners.
It is not very hard to criticize the Supreme Court opinion.  Any regulatory process, as Justice
Breyer noted in dissent, necessarily involves making distinctions among regulated parties.
The legislature had included the exceptions for academic research based on the industry’s
own arguments. Oddly enough, a total ban on all transfer of data would have probably been
a worse law, yet might have survived scrutiny, at least under the Supreme Court’s approach.
But in this essay I focus on a di erent problem, which is the Court’s complete indi erence to
its own role in the political process. Nowhere in the Supreme Court’s elevation of data
miners into speakers and the privacy laws into censorship is there any hint of concern that
the judiciary was about to put an ongoing political debate on ice. Nor did the court seem to
feel any discomfort about a federal judiciary interfering with what might be thought of as a
matter of state regulatory prerogative. Nowhere,  nally, is it mentioned that the
pharmaceutical companies were, in fact, the losers of a fairly contested democratic debate,
and that the exceptions in the law were a byproduct of that process
A large and embarrassing gap between rhetoric and result is a byproduct of this deliberate
indi erence. The Supreme Court relies on New York Times v. Sullivan, a case that stands for
the idea that public debate should be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” as it proceeds to
end a debate that was, in fact, quite robust. A case that upheld the prosecution of protestors
burning dra  cards is recruited, counterintuitively, to suggest the relevance of censorial
intent.  The Court also manages to suggest that nude dancing or even a  ag burned in
protest — an unpleasant, though undeniably political message — might be more readily
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The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, was not wrong to stress that the law should have
been reviewed by a standard appropriate for economic regulation, nor to point out the
dangers in the “constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists.”
But it could have been made even stronger by stressing the themes developed here. It could
have returned to Abrams and Sullivan for the viewthat the First Amendment is meant to
promote robust political debate and then observe that the Court, by its own actions, had just
ended such a debate. It might have emphasized the Court’s indi erence to its own
endorsement of the states as “laboratories of experimentation” for di cult matters of public
policy.  The dissent, in other words, should have submitted into evidence the fresh corpse
of the democratic process to establish the severely anti-democratic nature of the majority’s
actions.
Regulation of the Pornography Industry
If Sorrell represents First Amendment interference with state lawmaking, consider more
brie y two cases involving the same federal legislation: Reno v. ACLU  and Playboy v.
Federal Communications Commission.  In each case the Court confronted “family values”
laws passed during the far-reaching legislative process that resulted in the 1996 Telecom Act.
As a part of that Act, Congress passed new statutes governing Internet pornography sites
(then new) and also adult-entertainment cable channels like Playboy and Spice. The
democratic process approach described here suggests that the Court got the decision right in
Reno but wrong in Playboy.
At issue in Reno was the Communications Decency Act, which required that all indecent
internet content be placed behind an e ective age-veri cation screen.  Pornography sites,
under the law, would be required to make certain that their users were over the age of
majority. In Playboy, a new law required that adult entertainment cable channels (like
Playboy, Spice, and so on) “fully scramble or fully block” their channels for non-subscribers,
replacing a  ickering screen o ering occasional glimpses with a plain blue screen. The law
was a response to parental complaints of “signal bleed” — that is, sexual content becoming
visible to non-subscribers.
A super cial take might see the laws as similar: both purported to regulate new pornography
industries by creating clearer and stronger barriers to prevent access by children. But, from a
political perspective, there were important di erences. The Court in Reno, upon careful
examination of an extensive district-court record, concluded that the law was hopelessly
overbroad. It ruled that the law might require the lockdown of scienti c sites, educational
sites, and so on: the law “unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection.”
Reno might have been a closer case were it somehow cra ed only to deal with the Internet
pornography industry. But in striking down the law, the Court was actually defending the
rights of parties unrepresented in the political process: the unknown multitude of speakers
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and disparate groups are parties who may lack the ability to seek the protections of the
political process.
In contrast, the law in Playboy was far narrower in its scope. There was little or no question
of accidental censorship of unrelated speech. And Playboy and other members of the
pornography industry were the ones who fought the law in Congress, and it was their rights
as speakers that were at issue. The Court nonetheless struck down the law based on the idea
that there were “less restrictive alternatives” to what Congress did. The opinion is weak for
reasons described in the dissent (most clearly that the less restrictive alternative, home
 ltering, is obviously far less e ective  ). But the dissent could have been buttressed by
pointing out that the industry was seeking to use the First Amendment as an alternative to
politics, that they had obtained a legislative compromise but wanted more. For the Playboy
case was not a case of political censorship, nor one where the regulated parties were unable
to use the legislative process. Nor was Playboy’s speech actually being banned or censored;
the industry was being asked to install better  lters (as over time, as technology changed,
they did). This is why the Playboy case, if super cially similar to Reno,was quite di erent,
politically speaking. For at bottom, it represented a well-represented industry’s e ort to
knock out an unwanted regulation, as opposed to a law that actually threatened the
democratic process in any serious way.
To be sure, in its favor, companies like Playboy might have stressed that they historically
have been subject to a prejudice, one that has weakened their ability to get a fair hearing in
the legislature. Yet it should have also mattered that the law was a democratic compromise:
It didn’t ban pornographic cable channels but sought to restrict their viewing to actual
subscribers. Given that fact, the Court should have recognized its own weak position in
terms of reviewing power. Instead, the Playboy corporation, just like the data miners,
became the humble pamphleteer, simply hoping to catch the ear of an uncaring world.
Elaboration and Questions
Doctrinal Elaboration
There can be little disagreement that the role originally imagined for the First Amendment in
political debate does not resemble the role that the Amendment now plays in the political
process. Suggestive of this fact is an empirical study by John Coates  nding that the anti-
regulatory usage of the First Amendment by business now exceeds its usage for any other
purpose.  In this last section, the goal is to further specify the approach here introduced
and to answer some of the most obvious questions.
The introduction speci ed a three-category hierarchy of scrutiny under a process-driven First
Amendment review. In brief, the  rst category, the highest degree of scrutiny, are cases of
political speech, Abrams/Sullivan cases, already widely understood to be at the core of First
Amendment protection. A second category includes cases where judicial intervention
represents neither a protection of the political process nor its abrogation. Heightened review
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might be driven by the observation of obvious defects in the underlying political process or
some inherent reason to doubt that those whose rights were burdened had the capacity to
avail themselves of a political remedy (Carolene Products). The third and  nal category are
cases like Sorrell, where a court is asked to intervene on behalf of parties fully and fairly
represented in the underlying political process and by its intervention interrupt an ongoing
political debate.
This hierarchy raises a series of obvious questions. First, let me specify that it does not mean
that judges would never be justi ed in using the First Amendment to strike down a law that
was the byproduct of a fairly contested political process. As already stated, a law that bans
political speech is still interfering with the democratic process even if it was fairly arrived at.
Hence, a full debate that led to a law banning members of the Communist Party from
presenting their views would still be subject to strict scrutiny. A law could be overbroad and
thereby censor parties outside the political process, as in Reno v. ACLU. And a law that
emerged from a fully contested process could nonetheless be invalidated if it was irrational
— the court still has the duty to “determine the reasonableness of the legislature’s belief in
the existence of evils and in the e ectiveness of the remedy provided.”
Might this give parties reason to deliberately avoid participating in politics so as to preserve
the strength of their First Amendment claim? The point is an interesting one, for it would
seem counterproductive to discourage political participation. Yet as a practical matter it
seems it would be relevant only at the margins. True underdogs — those entirely
unrepresented in the political process (like random citizens) -- would, by de nition, be
una ected. We might also distinguish the cases of groups like the EFF or the ACLU who
generally promote the rights of others, as opposed to their own interests.
However, the politically powerful and well represented would sometimes face a choice —
arguably a fair choice — to devote their e orts to politics or litigation instead of taking
advantage of both. The law is full of doctrines designed to prevent similar forms of
opportunism, such as estoppel and preclusion doctrines, or those that require the
exhaustion of state or administrative remedies. Those doctrines respond to the unfairness of
allowing a second bite at the apple. There is a similarly evident unfairness in allowing well-
 nanced interest groups to hash things out in the legislature, blocking legislation or gaining
whatever concessions they can, and then, only if they lose, asking the courts to intervene —
using, without irony, a part of the Constitution meant to facilitate political debate.
Would this proposal give the judiciary the impossible task of assessing the validity of an
underlying regulatory or legislative process? The task is hardly impossible: The judiciary is
already in that business. Courts are constantly assessing the process due and also assessing
whether parties are trying to re-litigate previously decided matters under a new heading.
This is particularly true when a case involves both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)—
or state equivalents — and First Amendment review. In such cases, the judiciary is already
called upon to evaluate the underlying process that yielded the rule in question.
  
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There is reason to think that the D.C. Circuit has in fact already shown some impatience with
First Amendment challenges tacked onto APA challenges. For example, in the
telecommunications  eld, where every regulated party is plausibly a “speaker,” the
opponent of any regulation can always bring some kind of First Amendment claim. However,
the D.C. Circuit has come to reject such challenges, perhaps because it’s so obvious that they
are an e ort to circumvent the underlying regulatory process.  The most recent example was
the e ort to negate the net neutrality rules enacted in 2015, in which sellers of broadband
services claimed that the right to block or discriminate among speakers was a form of
editorial speech. The Court dismissed the argument without di culty. The unstated reason,
perhaps, was that given that this was the FCC’s third e ort to write a net neutrality rule in
the midst of a very public debate over the rules, it was obvious that deciding the matter on
First Amendment grounds would be an extreme arrogation of power to the judiciary over a
matter of widespread public concern.
Beyond Lochnerism
Over the last decade, scholars and dissenting judges have critiqued parts of the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as “First Amendment Lochnerism.” The critique
suggests that the protection of commercial speech has become a means for the judiciary to
strike down economic regulation at will, creating a contemporary equivalent to the
substantive due process theories relied upon by the Court in New York v. Lochner.
I am very sympathetic with the criticisms that fall under the Lochnerist label. But I want to
specify how a process-driven approach to the First Amendment might yield complementary
insights. A shared insight, already described in some detail, is that overzealous First
Amendment enforcement is actually at war with the democracy-promoting purposes of the
Amendment. To be sure, some of the Lochner critics, like Amanda Shanor, have argued that
the Court may “render self-government impossible.”  But the process approach a ords is a
more precise means of condemning interference with democracy on the First Amendment’s
own terms.
The outcomes produced are also slightly di erent. The critics of Lochnerism would
essentially call for more relaxed scrutiny of economic regulation that can be labeled, by a
clever attorney, as a burden on speech or a form of viewpoint discrimination. But the
process-driven approach embraces a broader set of speech categories, including the non-
economic. It also di ers by o ering the government an a rmative defense: that the plainti 
had a political remedy that it did not avail itself of. The results may o en be the same —
namely, the upholding of the law in question. But the reasoning is di erent, less grounded
on the idea that there is an intrinsic and natural di erence between economic regulation and
everything else.
Unlike the Lochnerist critique, the process approach also provides further insights as to
when the judiciary should feel it is empowered to strike down legislation using the First
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process, the original rationale for enforcement of the First Amendment. This isn’t to say that
process is all that matters in First Amendment cases, but it should not be ignored either, as it
usually is.
In the end, the Lochnerist and process approaches have the same villain, namely,
unjusti able judicial intervention to strike down democratically enacted legislation. As
critiques of the Court’s jurisprudence, they are fellow travelers. But the Lochnerist is more
inclined to suggest, based on historical reasons, that economics should be le  to the people,
while the process approach demands that a court justify its interventions in the absence of
political failure.
More Fundamental Objections
So far I have presumed that the legitimacy of judicial intervention is at least partially a
byproduct of its role in protecting the political process. But there are some who might think
the entire project of grounding First Amendment as a defense of political process has always
been misguided. A lesser version of this critique, based on Laurence Tribe’s well-known
critique of John Hart Ely, would suggest that process-driven theories must ultimately become
substantive anyhow.  The broader critique, rooted in natural law theory, takes the liberties
protected by the First Amendment as absolute and essentially free- oating, making the
discussion of process irrelevant.
These objections take us into a much broader debate surrounding Constitutional
interpretation than I am able to engage in this essay, but I wish to o er at least two
responses. The narrower response is doctrinal and historical. It points to the speci c history
of the First Amendment, which was activated by the judiciary in the twentieth century in
order to protect the political process. In other words, the Abrams/Sullivan concern for open
political debate is too fundamental to First Amendment jurisprudence to be ignored. What
I’m insisting is that the foundational concern for political process does not just compel
judicial action but also forbearance.
For those who take the First Amendment as a recognition of a natural right, the thoughts of
Justice Holmes and the reasoning of Sullivan might as well be so much background noise.
But those who have rejected the principles of majoritarian democracy and the consent of the
governed must at least recognize the inherent fragility of their approach. As John Hart Ely
implicitly predicted, only those constitutional rights explicitly enumerated or reinforcing of
representative democracy have tended to survive over the longer term.  A broad and free-
 oating First Amendment lacks any democratic justi cation better than Lochner’s. Hence it
is not hard to predict that the parts of the First Amendment that will survive over the long
term are only those consistent with the idea that the Amendment is an aid to majoritarian
democracy, not its enemy. For the Amendment was, as the Court put it, "fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
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